LOWI
Our thesis ↗ Momentum & leverage ↗ Agent pipeline ↗ Deployment timeline ↗
LOWI

Fractional real estate investment in Bangkok, Thailand.

Data. Discipline. Dividend.

8–10 %target IRR
5–7 %minimum gross yield
฿150Mfirst-year raise · ฿150M more, year 3
70 532live listings tracked
4 514buildings in reference set

Market figures measured 2026-09-01 and reproducible from the platform database. Return figures are a model, not a promise — every section carries a provenance stamp saying which is which.

Scroll · 16 sections · 5 annexes
02The ProblemMeasured

Foreign investors navigate blind.

Market inefficiency Problem 1 Market inefficiency Opaque pricing, fragmented data, and a wide gap between listing prices and transaction reality. Thailand has no public transaction registry — what circulates is what sellers hope for, not what changes hands.
Single-asset risk Problem 2 Single-asset risk Buying one condo means full exposure to one building, one street, one tenant — zero diversification and illiquidity over long horizons.
Cost burden Problem 3 Cost burden Agent commissions, legal fees and company-structure overhead erode returns on a single unit. Fixed costs do not scale down.
Access & friction Problem 4 Access & friction Thai bank account requirement, transfer paperwork, foreign-currency remittance rules, and the challenge of managing a property passively from abroad.

Our thesis ↗

03Market OpportunityMeasuredInferred

We buy the discount, not the market.

This is the sentence the whole thesis rests on, and it runs against the usual Bangkok sales pitch. The broad market is not the opportunity. The dispersion inside it is.

Window Baht entry point Currency depreciation gives foreign capital a favourable entry. Cuts both ways over a 10-year hold — see risk.
Cycle Near the bottom A new cycle is starting from a low base. The REIC Bangkok condo index sat at 163.3 in Q1 2025, +3.6 % year on year, with the broad market flat to contracting outside prime.
2030 Transit build-out Metro expansion completes after 2030. The districts involved will reprice, but their transformation is only just beginning. Unlike European metropolises, land values have not yet climbed on the announcement alone. Professionals are already taking notice.
2026 — new cycle 2015 2019 2023 2026 2030 2032
Condo units available (supply) Overall market price index Premium segment (decoupled)
Illustrative — order of magnitude, calibrated on public REIC / Bank of Thailand series. Not an official index.
1.6 M vacant condos is not a warning. It is the mechanism.

Oversupply caps land-value appreciation for a time: it leaves "common" stock sitting on the market longer, which weakens sellers' positions. The prime residential segment, by contrast, is not in crisis — time on market is longer than three years ago, but value on this segment has never stopped rising.

Policy tailwinds. Long-term visa schemes and the live foreign-ownership debate both point toward wider access, alongside a demographic tailwind of professionals and expatriates concentrating in Bangkok — over 103,000 registered in the city at the end of 2025.

Momentum and negotiation leverage analysis ↗

04Bangkok's MomentumMeasuredInferred

The market stopped rising everywhere. It keeps rising along the rails.

Funded · under construction Infrastructure surge Orange East 2028 — civil works complete, operator BEM signed. Orange West 2030. Purple South 2029, roughly 68 % complete by end 2026. Red line extensions 2029. Suburban connectivity unlocks mid-tier districts before they reprice.
Acted vs optional Redevelopment zones Bang Sue Grand Station and the Rama IV corridor are already acted and delivered. Khlong Toei Port and Makkasan remain longer-dated options — we price them as options, not as certainties.
Demand side Demographic tailwinds Thai young professionals converging on Bangkok; expat corridors — Sukhumvit, Silom/Sathon, Riverside — sustain rental demand independent of the tourist cycle.
The inversion Macro headwinds → micro opportunity Political uncertainty and household debt suppress the broad market — precisely what creates discounted entries for selective foreign capital. We treat political risk as a monitored input, not a footnote.
Metro — current
Metro — under construction
Development & demand zones
Acted / delivered Pending, longer-dated Expat / rental demand corridor
Development corridors and expat demand zones — same layer as the live map product, not redrawn by hand.
05LOWI: Pooled Asset Strategy

Every asset is tagged with the job it is bought to do.

A pool is not a pile. Buying five units for the price of one is not cosmetic diversification — each unit is selected for a distinct role, and the roles behave differently over a ten-year hold.

Role 1 · Cash flow Yield optimisation Family-sized units near operating transit, in buildings with proven rental depth. Target: within-building yield at or above the 5–7 % floor from day one. These units carry the pool's running costs while the others do their work.
Role 2 · Capital High-multiple resale Bought on an acted-but-undelivered corridor, or on a rarity the comparables cannot price — as with Four Street Mansion, a full-floor penthouse with no like-for-like comp. Lower running yield, accepted deliberately. What is purchased is the repricing.
Role 3 · Liquidity The exit unit A recognisable address in a known building, the kind any foreign buyer can price without help. It earns less. Its job is to be sellable inside 60 days if the pool needs to unwind early. This is the pool's liquidity insurance.
Role 4 · Value-add Renovation & tax position Discounted because dated, not because the building is weak. Renovation creates value immediately and may generate a deductible position. Renovation creates value immediately against a measurable baseline: the price gap between as-is and renovated units in the same building.
Operating principle Tenant management internalised Sourcing, vetting, maintenance and renewals run by the LOWI team in Thailand — no outsourced agency margins layered on top of the pool.
Operating principle One vehicle, shared overhead Legal, structuring and administration costs are carried once across the whole pool rather than repeated on every unit — the direct answer to problem 3.
06Structure & Guarantees

Investors own the assets. Nothing else.

Step 1 Investor Subscribes fractional shares under the subscription & yield agreement.
Step 2 · guarantee Escrow Funds held until critical mass. The escrow contract bars any payout except the acquisition and the goods and services directly necessary to it.
Step 3 Thai operations Rent collected in THB, withholding tax applied at source, tenants and maintenance managed under a service agreement.
Step 4 HK holding Holds the freehold titles. Receives net rent, handles distributions and investor reporting.
Guarantee Escrow, not trust Capital sits in escrow while opportunities are sourced. It can only be released against the acquisition subscribed to — never spent on anything else. This is a contractual bar, not an intention.
Guarantee Ownership separated from operations Freehold titles sit in the HK holding. The operating entity manages tenants and maintenance and carries the operational liabilities — so an operating claim cannot reach the assets.
The legal point that makes this work — and the one it is confused with

A foreign juristic person can hold a Thai condominium freehold in its own name, within the 49 % of saleable floor area a building may transfer to foreigners. This is expressly provided for by the Condominium Act; it is not a workaround. It must not be confused with the Thai-company-with-nominee-shareholders arrangement every guide warns against — we do not do that. The HK company buys as a foreigner, in the foreign quota, in plain sight.

07Investment ThesisProjection

Sexy is not the goal. Defensible is.

5–7 %gross yield, minimum
8–10 %target IRR
6–8 %conservative scenario
฿150M+150Myear 1 + year 3 raise · ~$4.2M each, no leverage
Selection rule 1 Larger floorplans only No studios, and no undersized 1BR. Luxury is space. Except for an unmissable location, we target units above 50 sqm to limit turnover and lock in yield.
Selection rule 2 International-school demand We target condos renting to international-school families: school within 5 km, metro within 500 m. Multi-year leases tied to the school calendar, not the tourist cycle.
Selection rule 3 High-demand locations Tight rental districts and future development corridors — transit build-out and redevelopment zones, weighted by whether they are acted or optional.
Selection rule 4 Freehold only, premium only No leasehold, ever — it is filtered out at collection, not later. No fixer-uppers except where renovation is the explicit value-add thesis of role 4.
Not in this number

No bank leverage — credit to a foreign buyer in Thailand is scarce, expensive, and would make the structure fragile. No currency hedge: an investor subscribing in euros or dollars carries the baht for the full term, both ways. No investor-level tax: taxation of distributions in the subscriber's home country sits on top and differs for every subscriber.

Deployment timeline ↗

08Where the 8–10 % Comes FromProjection

Where 8–10 % comes from, line by line.

A target IRR is not a claim, it is a decomposition. Gross rental yield of 5–7 % at acquisition, less roughly 2 points of charges, management, vacancy and property tax; plus corridor appreciation held at the low end of the observed 3–5 % prime range; plus the entry discount amortised over the hold; less 5–6 % of exit cost. Targets are gross of Thai corporate costs and contingent on discounted acquisitions — without the discount, the model returns the conservative 6–8 %, not the headline.

Gross rental yield at acquisitionFloor 5–7 %. Consistent with measured within-building yields: Bang Kapi 6.49 %, Suan Luang 6.51 %, Wang Thonglang 6.76 %.+5.0 to 7.0 %
Charges, management, vacancy, property taxCommon fees, internalised management, vacancy provision, insurance, annual property tax.−1.8 to 2.2 %
Capital appreciationHeld at the low end of the +3 to 5 %/yr observed on transit-connected prime since 2022.+2.5 to 3.5 %
Entry discount, amortisedA verified 20–30 % discount to the building median is latent equity, realised at exit. Spread across the hold.+2.2 to 3.0 %
Acquisition and exit costs2 % transfer, 3.3 % specific business tax (always due for a company), 1 % withholding. Amortised.−0.8 to 1.0 %
Target IRR, 10-year horizon8 – 10 %
09Why LOWI WinsMeasured

The algorithm gives confidence to the experts. The board decides.

Edge 1 Proprietary platform Automated multi-source extraction on a daily cycle across five independent portals, plus community channels. Every listing is cross-matched against proprietary pricing filters and per-building yield models. How it works.
Edge 2 On-ground expertise Every opportunity is qualified in person. The human audit re-prices the algorithm's headline discount into a defensible number — sometimes down, as with Thonglor Art 25; sometimes confirmed, as with Park Origin Chula-Samyan.
Edge 3 Operational discipline Standardised screening on every deal, documented decisions, and the discipline to walk away — as with Master View Executive Place, where a 40.8 % headline discount did not survive scrutiny.
Edge 4 Ecosystem ready Legal team, architects and local agents already engaged across the target districts, ready to deploy from day one.

The agent pipeline — 13 bots ↗

14The Investment UniverseInferred

This is a pool, not a fixed set of holdings.

Read this before the map below

Every property mapped and cased below is an example of what fits the investment thesis — screened and priced, but not necessarily acquired. What LOWI actually buys depends on what clears the bar when capital is deployed. The first four are the method, walked through in detail; the rest is the pipeline the method currently produces, including the one we walked away from.

● Yield ● Value ● Renovation ● Declined — Metro (current) ⋅⋅⋅ Metro (planned / under construction) ✈ Airport ◆ Monument
Noble Ploenchit
Noble Ploenchit
Yield
Asoke Towers
Asoke Towers
Value
Von Napa Sukhumvit 38
Von Napa Sukhumvit 38
Value
The Waterford Park
The Waterford Park
Renovation
Supalai Place Sukhumvit 39
Supalai Place Sukhumvit 39
Renovation
Thonglor Art 25
Thonglor Art 25
Value
Park Origin Chula-Samyan
Park Origin Chula-Samyan
Value
Four Street Mansion
Four Street Mansion
Appreciation
Master View Executive Place
Master View Executive Place
Declined
Thonglor Art 25 living area
Thonglor Art 25 Wattana · 2BR · 72 m² · ฿7.09M · ฿98,418/m² Engage
−25.7 %Screening discount — algorithm
vs units in the same compound
−20.2 %Verified discount — human audit
adjusted for street view & low floor
  • Compared past sales in the same condo with similar parameters.
  • Compared past sales of similar properties on the same street.
  • Compared same-vintage properties across the khet.

Why the gap? Street view and low floor aren't in the compound comps. The human audit prices them in, trimming the discount from 25.7 % to a verified 20.2 %. The deal still clears — but on a number that survives a buyer's own due diligence.

Seller motive — foreigner leaving the country, short on time to handle the sale.

Park Origin Chula-Samyan living area
Park Origin Chula-Samyan Ratchathewi · 2BR · 66 m² · ฿12.99M · ฿196,818/m² Engage
−33.2 %Screening discount — algorithm
vs units in the same compound
−33.2 %Verified — human audit
confirmed; thin comps offset by tension signals
  • Flagged thin data: only 4 sales in this condo in 2 years — investigated why.
  • District identified as "in tension": units here sell in under 30 days on average.
  • Neighbourhood values rising ~5 %/yr — scarcity, not weakness, explains the thin comps.
  • Upside not priced in: city view, high floor, metro / park / schools nearby, recent 46-storey build by Origin Property.

Why it holds. A four-sale baseline is exactly the situation that produces a false discount — see Master View Executive Place, where it did. Here the audit went the other way: the tension signal explains the sparse comps, so the headline number survives untouched. The same red flag resolves differently depending on why it is there.

Seller motive — retired widower relocating to the countryside.

Four Street Mansion living area
Four Street Mansion Chatuchak · 2BR · 250 m² · ฿17.50M · ฿69,980/m² Engage — resale thesis
−7.4 %Screening discount — algorithm
vs seller's original ask (฿19.0M)
฿69,980Verified anchor — per m²
no like-for-like comp; priced on fundamentals
  • Checked building comps — 254 units, but this is the only full-floor penthouse; no like-for-like comp exists.
  • Benchmarked ฿69,980/m² against renovated 2BR condos within 1 km of BTS Phahonyothin 24 — low end for the corridor.
  • Verified the 2025 renovation scope: European kitchen, 6 AC units, fully furnished — limits immediate capex risk.
  • Checked rental math: at this size and price, gross yield trails the 5–7 % floor — not a buy-to-rent unit.

Why we'd engage differently. This is not a rental play. A rare full-floor penthouse, renovated in 2025, priced under ฿70k/m² and 750 m from a BTS station, is a role 2 asset — capital appreciation, not yield. It is the clearest illustration of why every unit carries a tag: judged as a yield unit it fails, judged as what it is, it is the strongest item in the pipeline.

Seller motive — not disclosed on the listing; to be established directly with the agent before commitment.

Master View Executive Place living area
Master View Executive Place Wattana · 2BR · 195 m² · ฿9.00M · ฿46,154/m² Pass — we walk away
−40.8 %Screening discount — algorithm
median on only 4 sales — unreliable
~−15 %Verified discount — human audit
after repricing comps & commons renovation cost
  • Recomputed the discount: the −40.8 % came from a median over 4 sales — corrected the baseline.
  • Estimated neighbourhood yield on 2/3BR: approximately 3 %. Below the 5 % floor → stop.

Verdict. Beautiful location, pet-friendly, a real renovation angle — but highway proximity and building commons needing renovation kill it as a pooled rental asset at 3 % yield. Possibly a flip for someone else; not our mandate.

This slide is in the deck on purpose. An investment case that only shows the deals it liked is a sales document. The walk-away is what makes the other three readable.

Noble Ploenchit living area
Noble Ploenchit Yield Lumphini, Pathum Wan · 1BR · 95 m² · ฿9.99M · ฿105,158/m² Engage
฿50–70KComp rent, similar 1BR — agent estimate, not yet DB-verified
~7–8%Implied gross yield — if rent holds at scale

Couple-friendly, prime Ploenchit address on the Lumphini / Pathum Wan edge of Sukhumvit — worth confirming unit size fits the target tenant before committing.

Seller motive not yet established.

Asoke Towers living area
Asoke Towers Value Sukhumvit 21, Watthana · 2BR · 150 m² · ฿13.8M · ฿92,000/m² Engage

Needs a little renovation, but a huge 150 m² in a very well-located building — steps from BTS Asoke and Terminal 21. Foreign quota confirmed available on this unit.

Seller motive not yet established.

Von Napa Sukhumvit 38 living area
Von Napa Sukhumvit 38 Value Phra Kanong, Khlong Toei · 1BR · 54 m² · ฿6.5M · ฿120,370/m² Engage

76 units in the building, 10+ currently on sale — that oversupply is exactly what gives room to negotiate on a Thonglor-BTS address.

Seller motive not yet established.

The Waterford Park living area
The Waterford Park Renovation Sukhumvit 53, Watthana · 3BR · 204 m² · ฿16.3M · ฿79,902/m² Engage

Dated finish is what leaves the renovation budget — a residence we know, in a high-demand pocket of Watthana.

Seller motive not yet established.

Supalai Place Sukhumvit 39 living area
Supalai Place Sukhumvit 39 Renovation Khlong Tan Nua, Watthana · 2BR/2BA · 120 m² · ฿7.2M · ฿60,000/m² Engage — hold only
−34%Discount vs. nearest exact comp — same building, same spec (2BR/2BA, 120 m²)
~6–7%Hold-to-rent gross yield — clears the 5–7% floor across every scenario tested
  • Only exact same-spec comp in the building (2BR/2BA, 120 m²) sits at ฿90,833/m² — this ask is ~34% under it, wider than any verified discount among the case studies here.
  • Renovation budgeted at the high end (~25–30K THB/m²) for a 32-year-old unit (built 1994) — that is what turns a flip marginal-to-negative.
  • As a hold-to-rent asset the gross yield clears the floor across every scenario run (5.2%–8.5%, base case ~6–7%); as a quick flip it doesn't.

Verdict. Engage as a hold-to-rent renovation asset only — not underwritten as a flip. To verify before committing: the floor/view/legal reason behind a discount this size, and the condition of the building commons — the same audit step that flagged Master View Executive Place.

Assessed from an off-market marketing text, not yet a tracked listing.

15Fee Structure

What we're paid, and for what.

Fee Standard Founding investors
Acquisition fee
% of purchase price, one-off — covers sourcing, negotiation and due diligence
8–10 % 6 %
Management fee
% of gross rental income, ongoing — covers tenant sourcing, rent collection and administration
12 % 8 %
Worked illustration — founding terms

A ฿10M unit bought at a verified 20 % discount, renting at 6 % gross (฿600k/yr). An 8 % management fee leaves ฿552k/yr to the pool — a 5.5 % net-of-fees yield, before the embedded ~฿2.5M equity gain captured at entry. The discount is the point: fees are charged on a price that was already below the building's own median.

16The Team

Who carries this.

Photo
Co-Founder & Underwriting Anthony Schoenauer Built the LOWI data platform. Market selection, deal screening, structure design.
Photo
Co-Founder & Operations Amanda Tsong Coordinates the network of on-ground real estate agents responsible for property management and execution.
Photo
Bangkok Real Estate Agent Earnest 6 years of on-ground knowledge working for foreign HNW buyers.

LOWI® — Central, Hong Kong SAR.
© 2026 LOWI. All rights reserved.
Market figures: 2026-09-01, reproducible from the platform database.
Not an offer, not investment advice, not a solicitation.
schoenauer.anthony@gmail.com · live platform demo on request

Provenance stamps:
Measured reproducible reading · Inferred stated reasoning · Projection modelled assumption · decision pending

← Back to the deck
AAnnex · Allocation model

How the four roles combine into one return.

Slide 05 says each asset is tagged with its job. This annex says what that means for the pool's arithmetic — and where the choice still sits with the club.

The mechanism

Roles trade yield against optionality

The four roles are not four flavours of the same thing. Each one gives up something specific to buy something else, and the pool's job is to hold the trade-offs in balance rather than to maximise any single line.

Role Running yield Capital upside Exit speed What it gives up
1 · YieldHighLowMediumRepricing potential
2 · ResaleLowHighSlowCash flow during the hold
3 · LiquidityMediumMediumFastBoth, to stay recognisable
4 · Value-addMediumHighMediumCapital up front, plus execution risk
Why role 3 exists at all

On paper it is the weakest line: it earns less than role 1 and appreciates less than role 2. It is in the pool because Bangkok resale currently takes 180 to 240 days, roughly double 2021, against 25 to 30 months of standing stock. A pool with no fast-selling asset has no answer if a subscriber needs out, or if the market turns during the exit window. Role 3 is the price paid for that answer.

How a close is shaped

Three candidate mixes for a first close of ~5 units

At ฿50–75M and roughly five units, the mix is genuinely constrained — five units cannot express a subtle allocation. These are the three realistic shapes, and subscribers see which one a close is built on before they commit.

Mix 1 · Income-led 3 yield · 1 liquidity · 1 resale Distributions start early and look credible in year one. Lowest headline IRR, highest chance of hitting it. Best for a first close that has to prove the model works.
Mix 2 · Balanced 2 yield · 1 liquidity · 1 resale · 1 value-add Expresses all four roles at the minimum viable size. Carries execution risk on the renovation from day one, before the team has a track record with this pool.
Mix 3 · Corridor-led 1 yield · 1 liquidity · 3 resale Maximum exposure to the 2028-2030 repricing thesis. Thin distributions for several years — needs subscribers who genuinely do not want income before 2030.
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BAnnex · Structure

The quota, the company, the club.

Legal basis

What the Condominium Act allows

A foreigner — a natural person or a juristic person — may own a condominium unit in freehold, registered in its own name, provided the total floor area held by foreigners in the building does not exceed 49 % of saleable area. The remaining 51 % stays Thai-owned. The rule has stood since 1979.

One mechanical condition comes with it: the buyer must evidence an inward remittance of foreign currency into Thailand of at least the purchase price. That is the FET form, covered in Tax & exit.

The distinction that matters

This has nothing in common with the Thai company with nominee shareholders that every guide warns against. Here the Hong Kong company buys as a foreigner, in the foreign quota, in plain sight. There is no nominee and no circumvention: it uses a route the statute expressly provides. The practical consequence for an investor is that the title is clean and the asset resells to any other foreign buyer.

Jurisdiction

Why Hong Kong rather than Singapore or Malaysia

CriterionHong KongSingaporeMalaysia
Capital gains taxNoneNoneExempt
Anti-avoidance exposureLowSection 10LTo verify
Treaty with ThailandYesYesTo verify
Recognition, EU investorsStrongStrongWeak
Set-up costModerateModerateLow

The deciding line is anti-avoidance exposure. Singapore's Section 10L, in force since 2024, can tax gains on disposal of foreign assets received in Singapore where the structure lacks economic substance — precisely the profile of a passive holding vehicle. Hong Kong has no equivalent that bites as directly on this use case.

Malaysia's treatment of foreign gains is workable, but recognition among European subscribers is weaker and the treaty position needs case-by-case verification. It offers no net advantage over Hong Kong for this structure.

Collective form

A club deal, deliberately not a fund

The stated objective is to avoid a regulated structure — no management licence, no authorisation, and none of the fixed costs that come with them. That is achievable, but the boundary is precise and does not depend on what the arrangement is called.

Three variables determine it: the number of subscribers, the minimum ticket, and how subscribers are solicited — public solicitation flips the arrangement regardless of participant count. And all three are assessed in each subscriber's jurisdiction, not the company's.

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CAnnex · Tax & exit

What the Thai state takes, and when.

On disposal

Four charges, two of which never apply together

ChargeRateBaseForeign company
Transfer fee2.0 %Appraised valueShared by convention
Specific Business Tax3.3 %Higher of sale / appraisedAlways due
Withholding tax1.0 %Higher of sale / appraisedFlat rate
Stamp duty0.5 %Sale priceOnly if SBT not due

Two points are worth stating plainly because they are counter-intuitive. First, SBT and stamp duty are mutually exclusive — a transaction bears one or the other, never both, and for a company it will almost always be SBT.

Second, the SBT exemption after five years of ownership, available to an individual with registered domicile, does not apply to a juristic person. That is a structural cost of holding through a company: roughly 5–6 % of price at exit, carried in the model rather than discovered later.

What the treaty does not change

Almost every double-tax treaty, Hong Kong's included, leaves Thailand the right to tax gains on immovable property situated in Thailand. The choice of holding jurisdiction affects what happens after the Thai tax — the flow through to subscribers — not the Thai tax itself. Any presentation implying otherwise would be wrong, and an adviser would catch it immediately.

Money in, money out

The FET form is the single most important document in the file

When foreign currency is converted to baht for the purchase, the Thai bank issues a Foreign Exchange Transaction form (FET, formerly Thor Tor 3) and reports it to the central bank above a USD 50,000 equivalent.

It is used twice. At purchase, it conditions registration in the foreign quota. At sale, it conditions repatriation: the bank requires the original FET, the Land Office sale agreement, and evidence the withholding tax was paid. Repatriating up to the amount originally brought in is procedurally clean; repatriating the gain above it requires additional documentation but is not blocked.

Lose the FET, lose the exit

This is the most concrete documentary risk in the structure, and it is entirely avoidable: duplicate custody, at the company and with Thai counsel, from issuance. A perfectly valid title whose FET has been lost is still sellable — but the proceeds become very hard to move out of the country in foreign currency. For a pool with a ten-year horizon and multiple units, this deserves a written custody procedure, not good intentions.

Under review — affects role 4

Renovation spend and the disposal base

Role 4 rests on buying units discounted because they are dated, renovating, then letting or reselling higher. If renovation spend is capitalisable into the cost base, it reduces the taxable gain on disposal and role 4 becomes materially more attractive. If not, its weighting comes down.

The treatment is being confirmed with Thai tax counsel on two points: whether the spend is capitalisable against the disposal base, and whether it is deductible at the operating level against rental income. Until that is settled, role 4 is weighted on its commercial merit alone — the measurable gap between as-is and renovated prices in the same building — with no tax benefit assumed.

Any tax outcome in a subscriber's own country depends on their residence and on how a distribution is characterised in their hands. That is a question for their own adviser, and nothing in this dossier should be read as answering it.

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DAnnex · PlatformMeasured 2026-09-01

Why these numbers hold up.

Anyone can scrape 50,000 listings. The value is in five method choices, each of which came out of a measured mistake.

97 500listings in database
70 532live
4 514buildings
5independent sources
1 dcollection cycle
Choice 1

The building is the unit of analysis, not the listing

A district where one developer lists 200 identical units will have its median crushed by that single building. The statistic then describes one seller's commercial strategy, not the market. Median per building first, then median of buildings: one building, one vote.

A valuable side effect: this neutralises age, floor, view and orientation, which vary enormously within a building and far less between buildings in the same district. It is what makes a defensible figure possible even though year of construction is recorded nowhere.

Choice 2

Yield is computed inside the same building

The yield quoted everywhere else is a ratio: district median rent over district median price. Where a district mostly sells large units and mostly rents studios, that ratio describes no real property. Here rent and price come from the same building. Where the pairing is too thin, the figure is flagged rather than smoothed.

Hard to copy: it requires collecting both markets simultaneously, with building-name normalisation good enough for the two sides to find each other. Most players cover one side only.

Wang Thonglang6.76 %
Bueng Kum6.56 %
Suan Luang6.51 %
Bang Kapi6.49 %
Bang Na5.86 %
Huai Khwang5.79 %
Khlong Toei5.40 %
Vadhana5.34 %
Sathon5.13 %
Pathum Wan4.85 %
Bang Rak4.85 %

Within-building yield by district, studio/1BR stratum, measured 2026-08-31. Violet marks the districts the Orange line will serve in 2028-2030 — they carry both the highest current yield and the appreciation thesis. Grey is central prime: safe, liquid, already expensive. Bar length is scaled between the lowest district shown (50 %) and the highest (100 %); row tint shades from red (lowest) to green (highest) for the same read at a glance.

Choice 3

Cohorts are tracked, not listings

A listing that disappears and reappears under a new ID looks like a sale followed by a relisting. Most often it is an automatic repost to climb back up the results. Counting disappearances as transactions massively overstates absorption. Tracking runs on a cohort — building × bedrooms × size band × type — rather than an ID. If the cohort's stock is unchanged, nothing was absorbed.

Choice 4

One plausibility perimeter, and it is checked

The same bounds once existed in three copies that ignored each other. The measured result: properties excluded from one table still counted in the medians, and an "opportunities" list led with rentals miscategorised as sales, therefore at −100 % of expected price — a source artefact presented as the best deal on the market.

Bounds are now defined in one place, and an agent verifies every cycle that the application and the database say exactly the same thing. Out-of-bounds property is not a deal, it is data to exclude — and it stays visible: statistics are filtered, nothing is deleted.

Choice 5 — the important one

Nothing is inferred that cannot be shown

A query once identified "1,399 exact duplicate live listings", 8.7 % of stock. Deduplication was ready to be written. Ten rows were inspected first: the IDs were consecutive at the source and the listings were simultaneously live. They were not duplicates — they were distinct units in a new building, posted in bulk by one agency, at the same price because they are identical.

Deduplicating would have erased real supply — precisely what seller pressure is supposed to measure. Nothing is merged or deleted automatically; ambiguous cases go to human review and influence no statistic until cleared. The general lesson runs through the whole system: an aggregate count does not tell you what it counted. "1,399 duplicates" was a correct query and a false conclusion.

What this buys an investor

Every decision traces to a checkable fact rather than a model's opinion, and it is auditable row by row. It is also why this dossier can publish its own limits without collapsing: they were found by the system and its own error log, and recorded with dates. Risk & limits.

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EAnnex · Risk & limits

What can make this fail.

An investment case without this annex is not incomplete — it is suspect. Everything below is checkable against the database in ten minutes.

Regulatory · most serious The quota can move The 49 % ceiling has stood since 1979, but two opposite moves are under discussion in 2026: a rise to 75 % in special economic zones, and a cut to 30-39 %. No bill has been tabled. A cut would shrink both the eligible stock and exit liquidity — it is the single largest exogenous risk to the thesis.
Currency The baht, both ways Subscribing in euros or dollars and holding in baht creates exposure for the full term. Unhedged: a ten-year hedge would cost more than the expected gain. To be carried knowingly, not discovered.
Liquidity 180 to 240 days to resell Roughly double 2021, against 25-30 months of standing stock. This is the entire reason role 3 exists in the pool — see allocation.
Execution Off-market network is an intention Community-channel monitoring runs, but a rewarded human sourcing network — the thing that reaches deals before publication — is not yet built. The data platform is in production; these two must not be presented as equally mature.
Measurement Listing prices, not transactions There is no transaction-price data in this system. A delisting is not a sale. Thailand's registry is not public, so this does not get fixed — it gets stated.
Coverage Missing attributes Year of construction: 2,265 of 4,514 buildings (backfilled since, mostly from source-native data — still absent for the other half). Foreign-quota status is exposed on roughly 0.4 % of listings. Both gaps are closed by inspection and title check, not by the database.
Blocking for any trend claim

The series is short

First observation 2026-06-21. No claim of trend, seasonality or cycle is supportable at this depth. What is solid today is the photograph of the market and the method; the series is a documented promise, not a deliverable.

The reverse is worth stating in both directions: a competitor starting tomorrow gets tomorrow's snapshot, never the history. Delisted listings cannot be collected retroactively. A price series does not backfill — it accrues at one day per day.

Artefact

Listing duration is not time-on-market

The database gives an average duration between first observation and delisting. That figure must not be presented as time-on-market: first observation is not publication, it is when collection happened to cross the listing. On a daily cycle the measure is bounded by our own rhythm, not the market's.

One source's declared publication date was tested: median gap against first observation was −16 days — the listing seen sixteen days before its declared publication. The field actually measures being bumped to the top of results, so it measures agents' diligence rather than the market. It was discarded.

Technical fragility

Collection breaks, and will break again

One source changed its page structure and the collector kept running without error while returning zero listings, for several days. That is structural — a third-party site does not give notice. What changed is that the break is now detected the same day and escalated. The risk is not removed, it is made visible quickly.

Collection also runs on a single machine that must be powered on at scheduled times. A hardware failure interrupts the series, and an interrupted series does not backfill. A full archive is replicated locally, which protects the history already acquired — but not the continuity of collection.

Why this annex exists

Every weakness listed here was found by the system or its own error log and recorded with a date. That traceability, more than the figures themselves, is what makes the rest defensible — and it is the reason a reader can trust the numbers that carry a Measured stamp.