Fractional real estate investment in Bangkok, Thailand.
Data. Discipline. Dividend.
Market figures measured 2026-09-01 and reproducible from the platform database. Return figures are a model, not a promise — every section carries a provenance stamp saying which is which.
Foreign investors navigate blind.
We buy the discount, not the market.
This is the sentence the whole thesis rests on, and it runs against the usual Bangkok sales pitch. The broad market is not the opportunity. The dispersion inside it is.
Oversupply caps land-value appreciation for a time: it leaves "common" stock sitting on the market longer, which weakens sellers' positions. The prime residential segment, by contrast, is not in crisis — time on market is longer than three years ago, but value on this segment has never stopped rising.
Policy tailwinds. Long-term visa schemes and the live foreign-ownership debate both point toward wider access, alongside a demographic tailwind of professionals and expatriates concentrating in Bangkok — over 103,000 registered in the city at the end of 2025.
The market stopped rising everywhere. It keeps rising along the rails.
Every asset is tagged with the job it is bought to do.
A pool is not a pile. Buying five units for the price of one is not cosmetic diversification — each unit is selected for a distinct role, and the roles behave differently over a ten-year hold.
Investors own the assets. Nothing else.
A foreign juristic person can hold a Thai condominium freehold in its own name, within the 49 % of saleable floor area a building may transfer to foreigners. This is expressly provided for by the Condominium Act; it is not a workaround. It must not be confused with the Thai-company-with-nominee-shareholders arrangement every guide warns against — we do not do that. The HK company buys as a foreigner, in the foreign quota, in plain sight.
Sexy is not the goal. Defensible is.
No bank leverage — credit to a foreign buyer in Thailand is scarce, expensive, and would make the structure fragile. No currency hedge: an investor subscribing in euros or dollars carries the baht for the full term, both ways. No investor-level tax: taxation of distributions in the subscriber's home country sits on top and differs for every subscriber.
Where 8–10 % comes from, line by line.
A target IRR is not a claim, it is a decomposition. Gross rental yield of 5–7 % at acquisition, less roughly 2 points of charges, management, vacancy and property tax; plus corridor appreciation held at the low end of the observed 3–5 % prime range; plus the entry discount amortised over the hold; less 5–6 % of exit cost. Targets are gross of Thai corporate costs and contingent on discounted acquisitions — without the discount, the model returns the conservative 6–8 %, not the headline.
The algorithm gives confidence to the experts. The board decides.
This is a pool, not a fixed set of holdings.
Every property mapped and cased below is an example of what fits the investment thesis — screened and priced, but not necessarily acquired. What LOWI actually buys depends on what clears the bar when capital is deployed. The first four are the method, walked through in detail; the rest is the pipeline the method currently produces, including the one we walked away from.
vs units in the same compound
adjusted for street view & low floor
- Compared past sales in the same condo with similar parameters.
- Compared past sales of similar properties on the same street.
- Compared same-vintage properties across the khet.
Why the gap? Street view and low floor aren't in the compound comps. The human audit prices them in, trimming the discount from 25.7 % to a verified 20.2 %. The deal still clears — but on a number that survives a buyer's own due diligence.
Seller motive — foreigner leaving the country, short on time to handle the sale.
vs units in the same compound
confirmed; thin comps offset by tension signals
- Flagged thin data: only 4 sales in this condo in 2 years — investigated why.
- District identified as "in tension": units here sell in under 30 days on average.
- Neighbourhood values rising ~5 %/yr — scarcity, not weakness, explains the thin comps.
- Upside not priced in: city view, high floor, metro / park / schools nearby, recent 46-storey build by Origin Property.
Why it holds. A four-sale baseline is exactly the situation that produces a false discount — see Master View Executive Place, where it did. Here the audit went the other way: the tension signal explains the sparse comps, so the headline number survives untouched. The same red flag resolves differently depending on why it is there.
Seller motive — retired widower relocating to the countryside.
vs seller's original ask (฿19.0M)
no like-for-like comp; priced on fundamentals
- Checked building comps — 254 units, but this is the only full-floor penthouse; no like-for-like comp exists.
- Benchmarked ฿69,980/m² against renovated 2BR condos within 1 km of BTS Phahonyothin 24 — low end for the corridor.
- Verified the 2025 renovation scope: European kitchen, 6 AC units, fully furnished — limits immediate capex risk.
- Checked rental math: at this size and price, gross yield trails the 5–7 % floor — not a buy-to-rent unit.
Why we'd engage differently. This is not a rental play. A rare full-floor penthouse, renovated in 2025, priced under ฿70k/m² and 750 m from a BTS station, is a role 2 asset — capital appreciation, not yield. It is the clearest illustration of why every unit carries a tag: judged as a yield unit it fails, judged as what it is, it is the strongest item in the pipeline.
Seller motive — not disclosed on the listing; to be established directly with the agent before commitment.
median on only 4 sales — unreliable
after repricing comps & commons renovation cost
- Recomputed the discount: the −40.8 % came from a median over 4 sales — corrected the baseline.
- Estimated neighbourhood yield on 2/3BR: approximately 3 %. Below the 5 % floor → stop.
Verdict. Beautiful location, pet-friendly, a real renovation angle — but highway proximity and building commons needing renovation kill it as a pooled rental asset at 3 % yield. Possibly a flip for someone else; not our mandate.
This slide is in the deck on purpose. An investment case that only shows the deals it liked is a sales document. The walk-away is what makes the other three readable.
Couple-friendly, prime Ploenchit address on the Lumphini / Pathum Wan edge of Sukhumvit — worth confirming unit size fits the target tenant before committing.
Seller motive not yet established.
Needs a little renovation, but a huge 150 m² in a very well-located building — steps from BTS Asoke and Terminal 21. Foreign quota confirmed available on this unit.
Seller motive not yet established.
76 units in the building, 10+ currently on sale — that oversupply is exactly what gives room to negotiate on a Thonglor-BTS address.
Seller motive not yet established.
Dated finish is what leaves the renovation budget — a residence we know, in a high-demand pocket of Watthana.
Seller motive not yet established.
- Only exact same-spec comp in the building (2BR/2BA, 120 m²) sits at ฿90,833/m² — this ask is ~34% under it, wider than any verified discount among the case studies here.
- Renovation budgeted at the high end (~25–30K THB/m²) for a 32-year-old unit (built 1994) — that is what turns a flip marginal-to-negative.
- As a hold-to-rent asset the gross yield clears the floor across every scenario run (5.2%–8.5%, base case ~6–7%); as a quick flip it doesn't.
Verdict. Engage as a hold-to-rent renovation asset only — not underwritten as a flip. To verify before committing: the floor/view/legal reason behind a discount this size, and the condition of the building commons — the same audit step that flagged Master View Executive Place.
Assessed from an off-market marketing text, not yet a tracked listing.
What we're paid, and for what.
| Fee | Standard | Founding investors |
|---|---|---|
| Acquisition fee % of purchase price, one-off — covers sourcing, negotiation and due diligence |
8–10 % | 6 % |
| Management fee % of gross rental income, ongoing — covers tenant sourcing, rent collection and administration |
12 % | 8 % |
A ฿10M unit bought at a verified 20 % discount, renting at 6 % gross (฿600k/yr). An 8 % management fee leaves ฿552k/yr to the pool — a 5.5 % net-of-fees yield, before the embedded ~฿2.5M equity gain captured at entry. The discount is the point: fees are charged on a price that was already below the building's own median.
Who carries this.
Data. Discipline. Dividend.
Fractional real estate investment in Bangkok.
LOWI® — Central, Hong Kong SAR.
© 2026 LOWI. All rights reserved.
Market figures: 2026-09-01, reproducible from the platform database.
Not an offer, not investment advice, not a solicitation.
schoenauer.anthony@gmail.com · live platform demo on request
Provenance stamps:
Measured reproducible reading ·
Inferred stated reasoning ·
Projection modelled assumption ·
decision pending
How the four roles combine into one return.
Slide 05 says each asset is tagged with its job. This annex says what that means for the pool's arithmetic — and where the choice still sits with the club.
Roles trade yield against optionality
The four roles are not four flavours of the same thing. Each one gives up something specific to buy something else, and the pool's job is to hold the trade-offs in balance rather than to maximise any single line.
| Role | Running yield | Capital upside | Exit speed | What it gives up |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 · Yield | High | Low | Medium | Repricing potential |
| 2 · Resale | Low | High | Slow | Cash flow during the hold |
| 3 · Liquidity | Medium | Medium | Fast | Both, to stay recognisable |
| 4 · Value-add | Medium | High | Medium | Capital up front, plus execution risk |
On paper it is the weakest line: it earns less than role 1 and appreciates less than role 2. It is in the pool because Bangkok resale currently takes 180 to 240 days, roughly double 2021, against 25 to 30 months of standing stock. A pool with no fast-selling asset has no answer if a subscriber needs out, or if the market turns during the exit window. Role 3 is the price paid for that answer.
Three candidate mixes for a first close of ~5 units
At ฿50–75M and roughly five units, the mix is genuinely constrained — five units cannot express a subtle allocation. These are the three realistic shapes, and subscribers see which one a close is built on before they commit.
The quota, the company, the club.
What the Condominium Act allows
A foreigner — a natural person or a juristic person — may own a condominium unit in freehold, registered in its own name, provided the total floor area held by foreigners in the building does not exceed 49 % of saleable area. The remaining 51 % stays Thai-owned. The rule has stood since 1979.
One mechanical condition comes with it: the buyer must evidence an inward remittance of foreign currency into Thailand of at least the purchase price. That is the FET form, covered in Tax & exit.
This has nothing in common with the Thai company with nominee shareholders that every guide warns against. Here the Hong Kong company buys as a foreigner, in the foreign quota, in plain sight. There is no nominee and no circumvention: it uses a route the statute expressly provides. The practical consequence for an investor is that the title is clean and the asset resells to any other foreign buyer.
Why Hong Kong rather than Singapore or Malaysia
| Criterion | Hong Kong | Singapore | Malaysia |
|---|---|---|---|
| Capital gains tax | None | None | Exempt |
| Anti-avoidance exposure | Low | Section 10L | To verify |
| Treaty with Thailand | Yes | Yes | To verify |
| Recognition, EU investors | Strong | Strong | Weak |
| Set-up cost | Moderate | Moderate | Low |
The deciding line is anti-avoidance exposure. Singapore's Section 10L, in force since 2024, can tax gains on disposal of foreign assets received in Singapore where the structure lacks economic substance — precisely the profile of a passive holding vehicle. Hong Kong has no equivalent that bites as directly on this use case.
Malaysia's treatment of foreign gains is workable, but recognition among European subscribers is weaker and the treaty position needs case-by-case verification. It offers no net advantage over Hong Kong for this structure.
A club deal, deliberately not a fund
The stated objective is to avoid a regulated structure — no management licence, no authorisation, and none of the fixed costs that come with them. That is achievable, but the boundary is precise and does not depend on what the arrangement is called.
Three variables determine it: the number of subscribers, the minimum ticket, and how subscribers are solicited — public solicitation flips the arrangement regardless of participant count. And all three are assessed in each subscriber's jurisdiction, not the company's.
What the Thai state takes, and when.
Four charges, two of which never apply together
| Charge | Rate | Base | Foreign company |
|---|---|---|---|
| Transfer fee | 2.0 % | Appraised value | Shared by convention |
| Specific Business Tax | 3.3 % | Higher of sale / appraised | Always due |
| Withholding tax | 1.0 % | Higher of sale / appraised | Flat rate |
| Stamp duty | 0.5 % | Sale price | Only if SBT not due |
Two points are worth stating plainly because they are counter-intuitive. First, SBT and stamp duty are mutually exclusive — a transaction bears one or the other, never both, and for a company it will almost always be SBT.
Second, the SBT exemption after five years of ownership, available to an individual with registered domicile, does not apply to a juristic person. That is a structural cost of holding through a company: roughly 5–6 % of price at exit, carried in the model rather than discovered later.
Almost every double-tax treaty, Hong Kong's included, leaves Thailand the right to tax gains on immovable property situated in Thailand. The choice of holding jurisdiction affects what happens after the Thai tax — the flow through to subscribers — not the Thai tax itself. Any presentation implying otherwise would be wrong, and an adviser would catch it immediately.
The FET form is the single most important document in the file
When foreign currency is converted to baht for the purchase, the Thai bank issues a Foreign Exchange Transaction form (FET, formerly Thor Tor 3) and reports it to the central bank above a USD 50,000 equivalent.
It is used twice. At purchase, it conditions registration in the foreign quota. At sale, it conditions repatriation: the bank requires the original FET, the Land Office sale agreement, and evidence the withholding tax was paid. Repatriating up to the amount originally brought in is procedurally clean; repatriating the gain above it requires additional documentation but is not blocked.
This is the most concrete documentary risk in the structure, and it is entirely avoidable: duplicate custody, at the company and with Thai counsel, from issuance. A perfectly valid title whose FET has been lost is still sellable — but the proceeds become very hard to move out of the country in foreign currency. For a pool with a ten-year horizon and multiple units, this deserves a written custody procedure, not good intentions.
Renovation spend and the disposal base
Role 4 rests on buying units discounted because they are dated, renovating, then letting or reselling higher. If renovation spend is capitalisable into the cost base, it reduces the taxable gain on disposal and role 4 becomes materially more attractive. If not, its weighting comes down.
The treatment is being confirmed with Thai tax counsel on two points: whether the spend is capitalisable against the disposal base, and whether it is deductible at the operating level against rental income. Until that is settled, role 4 is weighted on its commercial merit alone — the measurable gap between as-is and renovated prices in the same building — with no tax benefit assumed.
Any tax outcome in a subscriber's own country depends on their residence and on how a distribution is characterised in their hands. That is a question for their own adviser, and nothing in this dossier should be read as answering it.
Why these numbers hold up.
Anyone can scrape 50,000 listings. The value is in five method choices, each of which came out of a measured mistake.
The building is the unit of analysis, not the listing
A district where one developer lists 200 identical units will have its median crushed by that single building. The statistic then describes one seller's commercial strategy, not the market. Median per building first, then median of buildings: one building, one vote.
A valuable side effect: this neutralises age, floor, view and orientation, which vary enormously within a building and far less between buildings in the same district. It is what makes a defensible figure possible even though year of construction is recorded nowhere.
Yield is computed inside the same building
The yield quoted everywhere else is a ratio: district median rent over district median price. Where a district mostly sells large units and mostly rents studios, that ratio describes no real property. Here rent and price come from the same building. Where the pairing is too thin, the figure is flagged rather than smoothed.
Hard to copy: it requires collecting both markets simultaneously, with building-name normalisation good enough for the two sides to find each other. Most players cover one side only.
Within-building yield by district, studio/1BR stratum, measured 2026-08-31. Violet marks the districts the Orange line will serve in 2028-2030 — they carry both the highest current yield and the appreciation thesis. Grey is central prime: safe, liquid, already expensive. Bar length is scaled between the lowest district shown (50 %) and the highest (100 %); row tint shades from red (lowest) to green (highest) for the same read at a glance.
Cohorts are tracked, not listings
A listing that disappears and reappears under a new ID looks like a sale followed by a relisting. Most often it is an automatic repost to climb back up the results. Counting disappearances as transactions massively overstates absorption. Tracking runs on a cohort — building × bedrooms × size band × type — rather than an ID. If the cohort's stock is unchanged, nothing was absorbed.
One plausibility perimeter, and it is checked
The same bounds once existed in three copies that ignored each other. The measured result: properties excluded from one table still counted in the medians, and an "opportunities" list led with rentals miscategorised as sales, therefore at −100 % of expected price — a source artefact presented as the best deal on the market.
Bounds are now defined in one place, and an agent verifies every cycle that the application and the database say exactly the same thing. Out-of-bounds property is not a deal, it is data to exclude — and it stays visible: statistics are filtered, nothing is deleted.
Nothing is inferred that cannot be shown
A query once identified "1,399 exact duplicate live listings", 8.7 % of stock. Deduplication was ready to be written. Ten rows were inspected first: the IDs were consecutive at the source and the listings were simultaneously live. They were not duplicates — they were distinct units in a new building, posted in bulk by one agency, at the same price because they are identical.
Deduplicating would have erased real supply — precisely what seller pressure is supposed to measure. Nothing is merged or deleted automatically; ambiguous cases go to human review and influence no statistic until cleared. The general lesson runs through the whole system: an aggregate count does not tell you what it counted. "1,399 duplicates" was a correct query and a false conclusion.
Every decision traces to a checkable fact rather than a model's opinion, and it is auditable row by row. It is also why this dossier can publish its own limits without collapsing: they were found by the system and its own error log, and recorded with dates. Risk & limits.
What can make this fail.
An investment case without this annex is not incomplete — it is suspect. Everything below is checkable against the database in ten minutes.
The series is short
First observation 2026-06-21. No claim of trend, seasonality or cycle is supportable at this depth. What is solid today is the photograph of the market and the method; the series is a documented promise, not a deliverable.
The reverse is worth stating in both directions: a competitor starting tomorrow gets tomorrow's snapshot, never the history. Delisted listings cannot be collected retroactively. A price series does not backfill — it accrues at one day per day.
Listing duration is not time-on-market
The database gives an average duration between first observation and delisting. That figure must not be presented as time-on-market: first observation is not publication, it is when collection happened to cross the listing. On a daily cycle the measure is bounded by our own rhythm, not the market's.
One source's declared publication date was tested: median gap against first observation was −16 days — the listing seen sixteen days before its declared publication. The field actually measures being bumped to the top of results, so it measures agents' diligence rather than the market. It was discarded.
Collection breaks, and will break again
One source changed its page structure and the collector kept running without error while returning zero listings, for several days. That is structural — a third-party site does not give notice. What changed is that the break is now detected the same day and escalated. The risk is not removed, it is made visible quickly.
Collection also runs on a single machine that must be powered on at scheduled times. A hardware failure interrupts the series, and an interrupted series does not backfill. A full archive is replicated locally, which protects the history already acquired — but not the continuity of collection.
Every weakness listed here was found by the system or its own error log and recorded with a date. That traceability, more than the figures themselves, is what makes the rest defensible — and it is the reason a reader can trust the numbers that carry a Measured stamp.